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I
INTRODUCTION
Most nations today participate in a dense network of international
cooperation that requires them to grant authority to international actors. At
varying levels this means that the individual state surrenders some autonomy to
international bodies or other states by authorizing them to participate in
decisionmaking processes and to take actions that affect the state. While some
international agreements involve only commitments, in many cases they also
include provisions that delegate some authority to a body to make decisions and
take actions. The continued growth in international organizations and various
standing bodies associated with international agreements suggests that states
increasingly find international delegation useful in addressing the challenges
associated with their growing interdependence.
Although delegation is often present in international cooperation, there has
been little systematic thinking about how delegation differs from other
cooperation and how it varies across cooperative ventures. There is little
analysis, for example, of what constitutes international delegation and what
features of such delegation may be important for understanding its causes,
consequences, and legal validity. A better conceptualization of the institutional
features of delegation may be useful for understanding how states weigh the
benefits and costs in making decisions concerning delegation. It may also be
important in addressing the increasing concern with the legitimacy and
accountability of global governance institutions.1
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1. See generally Daniel Bodanksy, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596 (1999); Ruth W. Grant &
Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29
(2005); Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405 (2006).
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This article defines and clarifies the concept of international delegation from
both a legal and a social-science perspective. In this respect, its approach is
similar to that of The Concept of Legalization, by Kenneth Abbott, Robert
Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal.2
Although these authors properly treat international delegation as one
component of legalization in international relations, delegation is worth
considering separately because it raises unique issues. The factors that affect
how one might classify international delegations may also differ from
legalization more generally. Indeed, some factors may even weigh in opposite
directions—for example, precision indicates a high level of legalization, but it
may indicate a low level of delegation.
The article begins by presenting a definition of international delegation as a
grant of authority by two or more states to an international body to make
decisions or take actions. Next, it describes the types of international bodies to
which states may grant authority. Much of the work on international delegation
to date has focused on grants of authority to bureaucracies and courts. While
we of course include these grants of authority in our analysis, our focus is
broader, in that it also includes grants of authority to collective bodies and
subgroups of states.
The article then identifies eight types of authority that states may grant:
legislative, adjudicative, regulatory, monitoring and enforcement, agendasetting, research and advice, policy implementation, and redelegation.
International bodies will often exercise more than one type of authority, and
there will sometimes be uncertainties about whether a particular type of
authority falls into a particular category. Distinguishing between the different
types of authority is important, however, because many of the existing
arguments and theories about delegation may not apply equally across the
different types of authority delegated. Failure to appreciate the variety in the
types of authority delegated may therefore lead to misleading generalizations.
Next, the article discusses how the extent of an international delegation can
vary depending on its legal effect and the degree of independence of the
international body. These factors have not yet been systematically explored,
although they modify the nature of delegation in significant ways. After
developing the typology, the article considers some of the benefits and costs of
international delegation in light of this typology. The article concludes with a
discussion of some of the questions raised by the typology and its implications
for further research.

2. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter &
Duncan Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401 (2000).
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II
A DEFINITION OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION
For purposes of the typology developed here, we define international
delegation as a grant of authority by two or more states to an international body
to make decisions or take actions. Several aspects of this definition warrant
clarification.
A. A Grant of Authority
The first part of this definition requires that there be a “grant of
authority . . . to make decisions or take actions.” Grants of authority for
international delegations are typically contained in the agreement that
establishes the international body. The United Nations (UN) Charter, for
example, contains various grants of authority to the main UN organs. If an
international body acts outside of its grants of authority, it can be said to be
acting ultra vires. This focus on a “grant of authority” is consistent with
definitions of delegation in the political-science literature. Hawkins et al., for
example, define delegation as “a conditional grant of authority from a principal
to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former.”3 Similarly,
in The Concept of Legalization, the authors define delegation to mean “that
third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the
rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules.”4
A grant of authority is what distinguishes a delegation from other exercises
of authority. A nongovernmental organization, for example, may take actions
that are similar to those taken by an international organization created by
states, but unless the actions of the nongovernmental organization stem from a
grant of authority from states, the actions do not involve an international
delegation.
The existence of such a grant of authority is also what distinguishes
delegations from mere commitments. Most of the terms of international
agreements concern commitments, through which states promise to behave in
certain ways and to subject themselves to “scrutiny under the general rules,
procedures, and discourse of international law, and often of domestic law as
well.”5 To take just one example, the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families spends its first seventy-one articles detailing the nature of these

3. Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation Under
Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND
AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3, 7 (Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L.
Nielson & Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006) (emphasis added).
4. Abbott et al., supra note 2, at 401 (emphasis added).
5. Id.
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commitments.6 The following articles of the convention, however, establish a
committee whose authority states can accept at varying levels.7 Thus, whereas
commitments and delegations are distinct, delegations often occur in
connection with international commitments, including commitments to comply
with the decisions or actions of the international body.
Our definition of international delegation does not require that the grant of
authority give the international body powers to make decisions or take actions
that are formally binding on states under international law.8 Instead, as with
issue area, type of authority, and independence of the international body, the
existence of legally binding authority is treated here as a variable that can affect
the degree of delegation.9 Under this approach, an international delegation will
exist even when states have granted an international body the authority to issue
only nonbinding resolutions, policy proposals, or advisory opinions.
Nevertheless, under this definition some international cooperation will not
involve delegations. For example, despite their potential importance, the annual
“Group of Seven” or “Group of Eight” summits involve at most a minimal
delegation. Leaders from the member countries meet annually to discuss and
potentially reach agreements on economic and political issues,10 but they have
not granted any authority to the collective in advance. Similarly, multilateral
treaty conferences, at which representatives of states meet to draft and
negotiate proposed treaties, do not involve international delegations because
there has been no grant of authority to make decisions or take actions on behalf
of the states parties. Although treaty conferences may result in the
promulgation of a proposed treaty, such a proposal is made only on behalf of
the states affirmatively endorsing the treaty, not the collective of states
attending the treaty conference.11
Finally, unlike definitions of international delegation that focus on a
principal–agent model,12 our definition does not specifically require that the
6. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, arts. 1–71, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990).
7. Id. at arts. 72–78.
8. Cf. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1492, 1494 & n.3 (2004) (defining delegation to international institutions as “vesting them with the
authority to develop binding rules,” and noting that “the authority so vested must be capable of some
kind of legal effect on the international or domestic plane: something more than mere pronouncements
or hortatory acts”).
9. See also Abbott et al., supra note 2, at 415–16 (treating the binding nature of the international
body’s actions or decisions as a variable).
10. See G8 Information Centre, What is the G8?, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/what_is_g8.html (last
visited Aug. 26, 2007).
11. By contrast, the treaty-drafting work of the United Nation’s International Law Commission
can be seen as involving an international delegation. In promulgating the proposed treaties, the
Commission is exercising the General Assembly’s authority (which the Assembly redelegated to the
Commission) to “encourag[e] the progressive development of international law and its codification.”
U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1(a); International Law Commission, http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ (last visited
Aug. 31, 2007).
12. See HAWKINS ET AL., supra note 3.
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grant of authority be conditional. Although international delegations typically
are conditional,13 the limits imposed on the exercise of delegated authority and
the circumstances under which delegated authority can be revoked will vary. As
a result, conditionality is treated here as part of permanence of commitment, a
variable that relates to the legal effect of the delegation.
B. By Two or More States
This article focuses on delegations by two or more states. The definition of
international delegation therefore does not cover delegations made by only one
state—for example, a delegation by a state to a private contractor. Although
such single-state delegations will sometimes be international in the territorial
sense, they do not implicate the same interstate cooperation issues implicated
by delegations that involve two or more states.
The delegation from states to an international body is typically part of a
longer “chain of delegation,”14 as illustrated in Figure 1. There is also, generally,
a prior domestic link within each state, because international delegation is itself
the product of delegation within the state, for example, from citizens to a
legislative body, or from a legislative body to an executive body. The analysis
here does not focus on such domestic delegation, although it recognizes that
international delegation raises interesting domestic issues both legally and
politically.
Our definition of international delegation does include redelegation,
however, because it also emanates from states, albeit indirectly. After states
delegate to international bodies, these bodies often have the power to
redelegate that authority to other international bodies or to other actors such as
nongovernmental organizations. For example, the UN Secretary-General may
delegate authority by appointing working groups or councils to assist his or her
work on issues ranging from Internet governance to the protection of civilians
in armed conflict. Redelegation is therefore a type of authority that states may
grant, and the exercise of this redelegation authority is itself an international
delegation.

13. For a discussion of the circumstances under which states are allowed to withdraw from treaties,
see generally Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005).
14. For discussion of chains of delegation, see, for example, Torbjörn Bergman, Wolgang C. Müller
& Kaare Strøm, Parliamentary Democracy and the Chain of Delegation, 37 EUR. J. POL. RES. 255, 257–
59 (2000). See also Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations:
Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241 (2003).
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Figure 1: Delegation Chain
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Although the focus here is on delegation by states, the definition includes
grants of authority that would not otherwise be exercised by a state.15 States
often engage in international delegation to address collective-action problems
that they cannot address individually. Some delegations, therefore, are not of
preexisting state authority, but of authority created among states. An
international adjudicative institution, for example, may exercise disputeresolution authority that could not be exercised by any one state. Nevertheless,
the exercise of such authority stems from grants of authority by individual
states.
C. To an International Body
Our definition uses the term “international body” to broadly signify some
entity to which states have granted authority to make decisions or take actions.
This includes any entity created by states, including a typical bureaucracy,
temporary commission, council of states, board of directors, or even conference
of parties. The concept of “international body” is therefore broader than that of
“international organization,” because international bodies need not have “a
concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive administrative

15. For an example of an approach that excludes such authority, see DAN SAROOSHI,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS 28–32 (2005)
(focusing on the conferral of sovereign state powers on international organizations). See also Julian G.
Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions,
85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 72 (2000) (“An international delegation is the transfer of constitutionally-assigned
federal powers . . . to an international organization.”).
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apparatus.”16 Bodies may have these attributes, but they may also exist only
temporarily, such as a task-specific commission or an arbitral tribunal. Multiple
international bodies may also be nested within any given international
organization. For example, the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) establishes the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which contains a
Conference of Parties, a Technical Secretariat, and an Executive Council.17
The definition of international delegation here includes grants of authority
by states to a collective or subgroup of states, or what some scholars have
referred to as a “pooling of sovereignty.”18 Although our inclusion of pooling
arrangements may contrast with some delegation literature, which defines
delegation as a grant of authority to “an agent,”19 it is in line with other
delegation literature, including that which speaks of external and internal
delegation by Congress, the latter being delegation to standing committees and
subcommittees within each of the legislative chambers.20 Barbara Koremenos
also speaks of internal and external delegation and notes, for example, that
states sometimes delegate dispute-resolution authority to a subgroup of
member states. 21
The congressional committee analogy may be particularly apt with respect
to international delegations. As one commentator notes,
[a]rguably, delegation to congressional committees, composed of a subset of the
membership, more closely matches circumstances at the international level than does
delegation to large, autonomous bureaucracies, which have fewer analogs among

16. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RES. 3, 4 (1998).
17. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction art. VIII, ¶ B(21)(k), Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800, 1974
U.N.T.S. 45, available at http://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwc_frameset.html
(last visited Nov. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention].
18. European Union (EU) scholars in particular have labeled delegation to collective bodies as
“pooling of sovereignty” rather than delegation, because these delegations do not raise the same
principal–agent issues raised by delegations to international bureaucracies. See, e.g., Shirley Williams,
Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community, 61 POL. Q. 299, 302 (1990); see also MARK
A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND AGENDA
SETTING IN THE EU (2003) (focusing on EU institutions that are separate from the member states and
not on the European Council or the Council of Ministers).
19. Hawkins et al., for example, define international delegation as “a conditional grant of authority
from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former.” HAWKINS ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 7. In the same volume, Lisa Martin notes, “In the case of the IMF, I simplify by
assuming that the EB [Executive Board], which directly represents member states, is the principal, and
that the management and staff (treated as a unitary actor) is the agent.” Lisa Martin, Distribution,
Information, and Delegation to International Organizations: The Case of IMF Conditionality, in
HAWKINS ET AL., supra note 3, at 140, 142.
20. D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 1–21 (1991).
21. Barbara Koremenos, Bringing More ‘Precision’ to the Three Dimensions of Legalization
(2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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international institutions. Similar to these committees, [international organizations]
22
are composed of a subset of states in the international system.

Following this logic, states are considered here to have granted authority to a
council or board that may be part of the international body but composed only
of a subgroup of member states. This holds even for states that sit on a board or
council, since they are still granting the board or council authority to make
decisions or take actions. An example is when states act through the UN
Security Council. Nonmembers of the Council clearly are delegating authority
to the Council to make binding decisions. Council members without a veto are
also engaged in international delegation under this definition, because the
Council can act even over their objection. Even veto-wielding members are
delegating an authorization role to the Council (for example, to approve certain
uses of military force), a role that is a type of legislative authority.23
Similarly, individual states may grant authority to a conference of parties,
which itself is nested within the larger international body and oversees the work
of other organs within that body. For example, within the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Conference of Parties can make
decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority.24 Its responsibilities
include approving draft agreements, provisions, and guidelines developed by
the Organization’s Preparatory Commission. Additionally, the Conference of
Parties oversees enforcement of the Chemical Weapons Convention and has
authority to “take the necessary measures to ensure compliance and to redress
and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this
Convention.”25 In some cases, regular meetings of the parties may be the only
“body” created by the delegation. This is the case, for example, in the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Landmines Convention).26
A private body or a public–private partnership can also be an international
body if states have granted some authority to that body. For example, the
European Commission has mandated that all European Union (EU) member
states follow the standards of the International Accounting Standard Board, an
independent, privately funded body that sets international financial reporting
standards.27 Private bodies such as nongovernmental organizations and

22. Alexander Thompson, Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of
Information Transmission, 60 INT’L ORG. 1, 6 (2006).
23. See infra Part III.
24. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, at art. VIII, ¶ B(18).
25. Id. at art. VIII, ¶ B(21)(k); see also id. at art. XII, ¶ 4.
26. See generally Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 [hereinafter
Landmines Convention], available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/millennium/law/disarmament/
xxvi_5E.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
27. See generally Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
19 July 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/
en/oj/2002/l_243/l_24320020911en00010004.pdf (regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the application of international accounting standards); see also Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe,
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corporations promulgate the vast majority of standards and codes of conduct;28
in situations in which they receive their authority from states, there is an
international delegation.
Table 1 illustrates some of the different types of international bodies to
which states may grant authority.
Table 1: Types of International Bodies
Type of Body
Collective Bodies

Conference of Parties
or Committee or
Council of the Whole
in which all are
members.

Subgroups

Council or board on
which not all are
members.

Third Parties or Agents

External and
independent.

Hired staff or
bureaucracy.

Examples
Meeting of state parties
under the Kyoto
Protocol, the
International Criminal
Court treaty, or the
Landmines Convention;
the Organization for
Security and Cooperation
in Europe; the European
Council.
World Bank Board of
Directors;
UN Security Council;
UN Human Rights
Council.
International Court of
Justice; collective
redelegation from one
UN agency to another;
International Accounting
Standards Board.
Secretariats and
implementing agencies of
various kinds, such as
under the World Health
Organization and the
United Nations
Development Program.

Global Private Governance: Lessons from a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 227–28, 250–59 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
28. See ANS KOLK & R. VAN TULDER, INTERNATIONAL CODES OF CONDUCT: TRENDS,
SECTORS, ISSUES AND EFFECTIVENESS (2002).
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III
TYPES OF DELEGATED AUTHORITY
This Part describes eight types of delegated authority: legislative,
adjudicative, regulatory, monitoring and enforcement, agenda-setting, research
and advice, policy implementation, and redelegation.29 International bodies
often exercise more than one type of authority. The UN Security Council, for
example, has arguably been granted both legislative and enforcement
authority.30 In addition, there are sometimes uncertainties about whether an
international body has been granted a particular type of authority,31 or whether
a particular type of authority falls into one or another category. Finally, the
scope of an international body’s authority will sometimes change over time.
This can happen formally, as a result of amendments to the underlying treaty
establishing the body, or informally as a result of changes in how the body
construes its mandate. It can also happen as a result of changes in the world—
for example, when changes in technology make the subject area of a delegation
(such as seabed mining or space development) more important.
A. Legislative Delegation
A legislative delegation grants authority to create or amend treaties (not
including regulatory schedules or annexes attached to the treaties, which are
classified below under regulatory delegation) or issue-binding directives. For
example, in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), some amendments can
take effect over objections—as long as eighty-five percent of total voting power
favors the amendment. Similarly, the UN Charter can be amended for all
parties based on the vote and ratification of two-thirds of the parties (including
the five veto members of the Security Council). The UN Security Council can
issue binding resolutions relating to peace and security, and EU institutions can
issue directives binding on EU countries. Legislative delegation, although
relatively rare, is important to legal scholars, because it may disturb the
constitutionally mandated distribution of authority in some countries or even
29. This list is not exhaustive. It omits some types of delegation, such as when states allow other
states or bodies to represent them, either for diplomatic reasons, or, as in the EU, when states allow the
trade commissioner to negotiate on their behalf.
30. See U.N. Charter art. 25, para. 1 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”); id. at art. 39,
para. 1 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”).
31. For example, there was some uncertainty surrounding the Security Council’s authority to
establish international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. See Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
(Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 32–34 (1996). Similarly, there has been significant controversy
over whether the committee that was established to monitor compliance with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has the authority to determine the validity of state reservations
to the Covenant. In a general comment issued in 1994, the committee claimed that it had this authority,
a claim that was challenged by several states, including the United States. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 429–37 (2000).

01__BRADLEY_KELLEY.DOC

Winter 2008]

6/9/2008 7:53:54 AM

THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION

11

warrant constitutional amendments, as has been the case with several European
countries during the course of European integration with the EU. Political
scientists also care about the delegation of legislative authority because its legal
implications raise questions about when and why states will make such
delegation and with what effects.
Legislative delegations typically encompass the authority to mandate state
compliance with certain requirements, but they can also encompass the
authority to authorize state conduct. Under the UN Charter, for example, states
are prohibited from using military force against other states except in selfdefense.32 The Security Council, however, has the authority to authorize states
to use nondefensive force and thereby render what would have been illegal
conduct into legal conduct.33
B. Adjudicative Delegation
Adjudicative delegation grants authority to make a decision about a
controversy or dispute. The term adjudicative does not mean that the decision
must be binding. Many agreements provide for informal mediation, nonbinding
arbitration, or advisory opinions. States do, however, often delegate binding
adjudicative authority to permanent or ad hoc courts, or to issue-specific
arbitral bodies (such as the Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal and the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Chapter 11 and Chapter 19 arbitrations). In
addition, states commonly delegate internally to the member states of a given
agreement by providing procedures for resolution of compliance issues or other
disagreements relating to the agreement.34
Adjudicative authority, whether it is granted to courts, tribunals, or ad hoc
internal bodies, may cover interstate disputes, disputes between a state and an
international organization, disputes between institutions within an international
organization, disputes between private parties and states, or disputes between
private parties and international organizations.35 The International Court of
Justice (ICJ), for example, has binding dispute-resolution authority only with
respect to disputes between states. By contrast, the European Court of Human
Rights can adjudicate disputes between private parties and states.36
International criminal tribunals (such as the International Criminal Court)
exercise yet another form of adjudicative authority, addressing disputes
between the international community and individuals.

32. See U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51.
33. See UN Charter art. 42.
34. See Barbara Koremenos, An Economic Analysis of International Rulemaking (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
35. See Karen J. Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding
Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (Winter 2008).
36. Keohane et al. usefully distinguish between traditional interstate dispute resolution, in which
states are conceived as unitary actors, and transnational dispute resolution, which is open to individuals
and groups in civil society. See Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 457–58 (2000).
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International adjudication can overlap with, and even directly interact with,
domestic adjudication. National courts in the EU, for example, are often
required to seek preliminary rulings from the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
concerning EU law and to apply those rulings in cases before them. The ICJ has
issued a series of decisions relevant to U.S. criminal adjudication, and the U.S.
Supreme Court recently had to consider what weight to give to those decisions.37
Furthermore, several years ago a Chapter 11 NAFTA arbitration panel
considered whether a state trial court’s civil adjudication in the United States
violated U.S. treaty obligations under NAFTA.38
C. Monitoring and Enforcement Delegation
Monitoring and enforcement delegation grants authority to take measures
to monitor or enforce compliance with state commitments.39 Although different
in nature, monitoring and enforcement are both designed to induce compliance
with international obligations. Monitoring authority can range from voluntary
reporting standards to mandatory on-site inspections, and can be carried out
either by a standing body (such as the International Atomic Energy Association
or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) or on an ad hoc
basis (as under the Landmines Convention).40 Some monitoring authority
enables the body only to collect and distribute the information, while other
bodies have the authority to determine and declare whether a state is in
compliance. Classic examples of monitoring delegations are the many human
rights and environmental treaties that create bodies to which member states
become obligated to submit regular reports.
As part of monitoring and enforcement delegation, states may also grant
authority to an international body to launch investigations into the conduct of
individual member states. For example, in 2005 the Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly opened an investigation into allegations about the
existence of secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) detention centers in
member states.41 Soon thereafter, the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe, Terry Davis, acting under Article 52 of the European Convention on
Human Rights,42 sent a questionnaire to the forty-five states parties to this
37. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2682–88 (2006) (giving only “respectful
consideration” to an ICJ decision).
38. See U.S. Department of State, The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3755.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2007). See generally Ernest A. Young,
Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143 (2005) (discussing the
Loewen case).
39. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 16, at 27 (discussing various methods of enforcement used by
international organizations).
40. See Landmines Convention, supra note 26, at art. VIII.
41. Council of Europe, Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member States,
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Events/2006-cia/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2007).
42. Article 52 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe may request “any High Contracting Party . . . [to] furnish an explanation of the
manner in which its internal law ensures the effective implementation of any of the provisions of this
Convention.” Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
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convention. After the Secretary General released his report, the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (the Council of Europe’s advisory
body on constitutional matters) published its opinion on the international legal
obligations of Council of Europe member states concerning secret detention
facilities and interstate transport of prisoners.43 Many treaties hold similar
provisions that allow the launch of investigations, and states are often legally
obligated to cooperate with such investigations. For example, the International
Labour Organization governing body may refer complaints about
noncompliance by member states to a Commission of Inquiry,44 and member
states have agreed to “place at the disposal of the Commission all the
information in their possession which bears upon the subject-matter of the
complaint.”45
There is a wide range of enforcement authority. Often, the enforcement
authority of international bodies is “soft” in that it involves primarily the
mobilization of peer pressure to induce state compliance.46 This is true, for
example, of most human rights monitoring bodies. In practice, this has also
been the case for the International Court of Justice; although the Security
Council can in theory enforce decisions of the Court, it has never done so.47
Sometimes, enforcement may take the more tangible form of a withdrawal of
voting power, membership, or institutional benefits. Members of the UN, for
example, can lose voting rights in the General Assembly if they fail to pay
dues.48
Some international bodies can exercise “strong” forms of enforcement. The
Security Council can use coordinated economic, trade, or even military
sanctions. The International Criminal Court has the authority to imprison
individuals who commit certain types of international crimes. Some monitoring
and enforcement involves police-type authority that allows intrusions on the
territory of a state. This is the case, for example, under the Chemical Weapons
Convention.49 The enforcement authority of an international body can be

1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (formerly art. 57, amended by Protocol No. 11 to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 1994 (Nov. 1,
1998), E.T.S. 155, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 960 (1994)).
43. Council of Europe—Venice Commission, Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of
Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detentions Facilities and Inter-State Transport
of Prisoners, 66th plen. sess., CDL-AD(2006)009 (Mar. 17–18, 2006), available at
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2006/CDL-AD(2006)009-e.pdf.
44. International Labour Organization, Constitution art. 26, ¶¶ 2–3, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/constq.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
45. Id. at art. 27.
46. The political-science literature discusses, for example, social influence and shaming. See, e.g.,
Alastair Iain Johnston, Treating International Institutions as Social Environments, 45 INT’L STUD. Q.
487, 499–501 (2001).
47. See generally SHABTAI ROSENNE & YAEL RONEN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920–2005 (2006).
48. See U.N. Charter art. 19.
49. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, at Annex on Implementation and
Verification.
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substantially enhanced if its orders or decisions have direct domestic effect, as is
the case, for example, with the decisions of the European Court of Justice.50
D. Regulatory Delegation
A regulatory delegation grants authority to create administrative rules to
implement, fill gaps in, or interpret preexisting international obligations. Like
legislative authority, regulatory authority affects international obligations and
therefore raises important legal considerations. For example, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) has the power to adopt binding interpretations of the
various WTO trade agreements by a three-fourths vote.51 Other organizations
have the authority to amend their regulatory annexes and schedules.52
As can be the case in domestic law, there may be uncertainties associated
with the distinction between legislative and regulatory delegations. When does
regulation become so extensive or removed from the original treaty that it
amounts to legislation? This can matter to domestic law, which may require a
particular domestic process for new treaty commitments. Regulatory
delegations also may raise questions for legal scholars about the extent to which
domestic administrative-law concepts should be applied to the international
arena.53 In addition, such delegations may be of interest to political scientists
studying the circumstances under which international institutions stray from
their original mandates.
E. Agenda-Setting
The delegation of agenda-setting authority allows an international body to
formally set or control the legislative agenda of an international body or of
member states. Formal agenda-setting power refers to “the ability of a given
actor to initiate policy proposals for consideration among a group of legislators”
and includes the ability of actors to keep certain items off the agenda.54
Formal agenda-setting power depends on several institutional features such
as who may propose an initiative, the voting rules, and the rules governing
amendments.55 For example, an international body may have the right of

50. See KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW 17–20 (2001).
51. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IX(2), Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (“The decision to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by
three-fourths majority of the Members.”).
52. See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Specialized Law-Making Processes, in 1 UNITED NATIONS
LEGAL ORDER 124–35 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995).
53. See generally Symposium, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (Summer/Autumn 2005); Symposium, Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in
the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1–278 (2006); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at
the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006).
54. Mark Pollack, Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the European Community, 51 INT’L
ORG. 99, 104 (1997). On formal agenda-setting power within the United States, see also Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 27 (1979), and KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 20.
55. Pollack, supra note 54, at 121.
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initiative, as is the case with the European Commission, which has the sole right
to initiate legislation in the EU. The actions of an international body may also
obligate states to consider certain issues on their domestic legislative agenda.
For example, members of the International Labour Organization are required
to bring conventions adopted by the Organization before their domestic
authorities “for the enactment of legislation or other action.”56 The
Organization also controls what treaties get proposed under the convention.
This formal or procedural agenda-setting power is distinct from what has
been labeled substantive or informal agenda-setting power.57 Informal agendasetting power is the general ability of many different types of actors to influence
the substantive agenda of an international body or the international community
more broadly by bringing attention to a particular issue in a way that may
indirectly influence the formal agenda. Informal agenda-setting power may be
the consequence of other forms of delegation, but it is not itself deliberately
granted, so it is not included here under the concept of delegation.
F. Research and Advice
A grant of research and advice authority permits an international body to
gather information about a topic and possibly to issue recommendations,
opinions, or interpretations. Research and advice is by definition not binding,
although the reports and findings of the international body may by mandate be
entitled to discussion in a designated forum.
Sometimes research and advice delegations are temporary and ad hoc. For
example, during the recent efforts to reform the UN, the UN Secretary-General
appointed a group of eminent experts, as is often done within the UN.58 He also
established a Working Group on Internet Governance to investigate and make
proposals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of the Internet by 2005.59
Other recent advisory delegations include the Advisory Committee for the
Secretary-General’s in-depth study on violence against women. The mandate
instructs the committee to conduct an in-depth study on the types, incidences,
causes and consequences of violence against women globally; to solicit
information on best practices from member states; and then to “submit a
56. ILO Constitution, supra note 44, at art. 19, ¶ 5(b). See Laurence R. Helfer, Monitoring
Compliance with Unratified Treaties: The ILO Experience, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 200 (Winter
2008).
57. For an excellent discussion and literature review of formal versus informal agenda-setting
power, see Pollack, supra note 54, at 121–28.
58. See Reform at the United Nations, http://www.un.org/reform/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
59. See National Telecommunications and Information Administration, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
(last visited Jan. 29, 2008). The working group’s report recommended the creation of a Global Internet
Council consisting of governments and involved stakeholders to take over the U.S. oversight role of the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, and recommended that several other
international bodies manage the Internet. However, right before the report came out, the United States
stated that it wished to maintain its sole authorizing role. Subsequently, the Secretary-General
established a small Secretariat in Geneva to assist in the convening of “the Internet Governance
Forum,” a body that came out of the working group. See Internet Governance Forum,
http://www.intgovforum.org/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
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report . . . to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session[,] . . . including actionoriented recommendations, for consideration by States, encompassing, inter
alia, effective remedies and prevention and rehabilitation measures.”60 The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development also serves
extensive research functions through, for example, its Directorate for Science,
Technology, and Industry.
Advisory delegations may also be long-term. For example, the SecretaryGeneral may create standing advisory bodies such as the Council of
Development Advisers, proposed in his March 21, 2005, speech to the General
Assembly.61 Advisory bodies may even become formal and permanent
intergovernmental organizations. For example, in 1988 the World
Meteorological Organization and the UN Environment Programme established
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC does not
itself conduct research, but it assesses existing research and issues reports that
include “options for adaptation and mitigation.”62
G. Policy Implementation
States often grant international bodies authority to implement policies. The
World Bank, the IMF, the World Health Organization, and many other UN
agencies have authority to expend and allocate resources to carry out agreedupon programs and projects, including internal administrative tasks. Like other
forms of policy implementation, the delegation of spending power (including
lending power) entails opportunity costs in terms of what other policies the
state might have been able to autonomously create. From the perspective of
political science, this category of delegation is important, because it is often
created to optimize the provision of public goods when states benefit from the
pooling of resources. Delegating policy implementation poses fewer issues for
legal scholars because it does not involve the creation of legally binding rules or
decisions and because there tend to be fewer domestic restraints on the
delegation of implementation authority than on that of other authorities.
Nevertheless, delegating policy implementation can be politically contentious,
as has been evident with the United States’ concern that UN agencies could end
up disbursing U.S. taxpayer money for activities that promote abortions. For
political scientists, policy implementation also raises issues of defection and
free-riding, as well as effectiveness.

60. In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 185, ¶ (d), U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/185 (Mar. 18, 2004).
61. See Secretary-General Statement to the General Assembly (Mar. 21, 2005),
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/sg-statement.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
62. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Principles Governing IPCC Work (1998),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ipcc-principles/ipcc-principles.pdf.
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H. Redelegation
The authority of redelegation permits the international body to further
delegate authority to another entity. For international delegations, the other
entity may be an international organization or a private body such as a
nongovernmental organization. The World Health Organization and other UN
implementing agencies, for example, often delegate various in-country tasks by
subcontracting with various nongovernmental organizations or even with
private, for-profit organizations. Redelegation may also entail the creation of
new bodies that emanate from the original international body, such as the IPCC
or the Working Group on Internet Governance.
Some forms of authority may be more frequently redelegated than others.
Implementation delegation is the most common, while redelegation of
legislative and regulatory authority is rare. One example of redelegating
regulatory authority is the decision by the European Commission, as noted
above, to delegate standard-setting to the International Accounting Standards
Board, a private body.63 Redelegation is not confined to issues of particular
substance and may occur even in sensitive areas, as illustrated by the UN’s
redelegation of peace-keeping activities to regional organizations such as
NATO or specific member states.64
IV
EXTENT OF DELEGATION
We discussed above the types of international bodies that may be granted
authority, and some of the types of authority that may be granted to these
bodies. This Part discusses how the extent of a grant of authority can vary
depending on its legal effect and the degree of independence of the
international body.
A. Legal Effect
An important feature of delegation is its legal effect. Just as a higher degree
of obligation correlates with a higher level of legalization,65 delegations that
allow international bodies to create binding legal obligations are more extensive
than similar delegations of only advisory or agenda-setting authority. This is so
because the presence of such legal obligations can implicate additional domestic
and international constraints. In addition, a delegation is greater still if the
international body has the authority to create binding obligations that have
domestic legal effect (as is the case, for example, with the European Court of
Justice), because the international body then has the benefit of domestic
enforcement machinery. Sometimes the domestic validity of delegations can be
63. See text accompanying note 27.
64. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1244, Annex 2(4) (June 10, 1999) (authorizing NATO to deploy forces in
Kosovo to maintain security).
65. See Abbott et al., supra note 2, at 408–12.
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affected by their legal status. For example, in a recent decision, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit construed a delegation as nonbinding in order
to avoid what it perceived to be constitutional concerns.66
An emphasis on legal effect does not mean that nonbinding delegation is
insignificant. As research on the concept of “soft law” has illustrated,67 such
delegation may circumscribe policy autonomy by creating international or
domestic pressure on governments. Consider, for example, the committee
established to monitor compliance with the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The committee
is charged with receiving reports from the states’ parties concerning their efforts
to comply with the Convention and with making “such general comments on
the report[s] as it may consider appropriate.”68 These comments often receive
substantial attention, as when the committee issued a comment in May 2006
calling on the United States to close down the Guantanamo Bay detention
facility used to house detainees in the war on terrorism.69 Similarly, the 2004
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the legality of
Israel’s separation barrier in occupied Palestinian territory involved a
significant exercise of authority, even though it was not legally binding.70
Nonbinding standards and codes of conduct can also be important. For
example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has
issued guidelines for activities by multinational enterprises,71 and the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, established in the 1960s by the World Health
Organization and the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, promulgates
international food standards.72

66. See NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8–9 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
67. See Abbott et al., supra note 2.
68. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 19, ¶¶ 1, 3, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
69. See Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under
Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, ¶
22, UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May 18, 2006), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/cat/docs/AdvanceVersions/CAT.C.USA.CO.2.pdf (“State party [the United States] should cease
to detain any person at Guantanamo Bay and close this detention facility . . . .”); Tim Golden, U.S.
Should Close Prison in Cuba, U.N. Panel Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2006, at A1.
70. See International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (July 9, 2004), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2007).
71. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34889_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited
Aug. 30, 2007).
72. See Food and Agricultural Organization, The Codex System: FAO, WHO and the Codex
Alimentarius Commission,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/W9114E/W9114e04.htm#TopOfPage (last visited Aug. 30, 2007). The WTO
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures makes presumptive rules out of these nonbinding
guidelines. If a state wants to adopt regulations that are higher than the Codex, it must produce
scientific evidence showing that the regulation is necessary to protect against a risk. This can be difficult
to do with low-level risks, as the EU learned when it lost the beef-hormones case on precisely this issue.
See Tim Büthe, The Globalization of Health and Safety Standards: Delegation of Regulatory Authority
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Even when the decisions or actions of an international body are legally
binding, their effect will depend on the type of enforcement authority
associated with the delegation. Thus, the delegation to the UN Security Council
entails a high legal effect because the Council not only can issue binding
resolutions but also can enforce these resolutions through a wide range of
multilateral sanctions, including the use of force. Similarly, the legal effect of
the delegation to the International Criminal Court is high because it can
enforce its criminal judgments directly through the strong sanction of
imprisonment. The legal effect of WTO decisions, while significant, is somewhat
lower, in that these decisions are subject to enforcement only through the threat
of sanctions by the prevailing party, which will vary in any given case. Lower
still is the legal effect of delegation to the International Court of Justice.
Although ICJ decisions in contentious cases are legally binding, the ICJ has no
direct means of enforcing the decisions. Prevailing parties can seek enforcement
of ICJ decisions through the Security Council, but such efforts are subject to
veto, and the Security Council has never in fact enforced an ICJ decision. Nor,
unlike European Court of Justice decisions, are ICJ decisions typically
considered directly enforceable in domestic courts.73
Figure 2 illustrates how the components of legal effect can vary based on
whether the output of the international body is legally binding and whether the
legal obligation is enforceable. Table 2 illustrates how the total legal effect
results from a combination of these two factors.

in the SPS-Agreement of the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 71 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (Winter 2008).
73. See generally A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 877 (2000).
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Figure 2: Factors Influencing Legal Effect

Obligation

Low
Not legally binding,
either internationally
or domestically.

Enforceability Depends on
voluntary
compliance.

High
Legally binding, both
internationally and
domestically.
Strong, direct sanctions,
such as the use of force,
criminal punishment, or
direct national court
application.

Table 2: Combined Legal Effect as a Function of Obligation and Enforceability

High
Obligation
Low

Enforceability
High
Low
High legal effect:
Moderate legal effect:
Security Council,
Human Rights Council.
European Union.
Low to moderate legal
Low legal effect:
effect: Nontreaty norms Nontreaty norms against
against nuclear
use of the death penalty.
proliferation.

B. Independence of the International Body
Another factor that affects the extent of delegation is the independence of
the international body. Independence, in turn, depends on the control
mechanisms that a state has over the decisionmaking body through its
representation on the body, the body’s rules and procedures, other institutional
features such as oversight mechanisms, the permanence of the delegation, and
authority over finances.74 These attributes may be present in any combination.
In addition to varying among international bodies, some of them vary as to the
same international body based on its relationship with the different stateparties.
74. Our approach here overlaps to some extent with the list of control mechanisms developed in
the literature on delegation within the EU, see POLLACK, supra note 18, and with the internationalorganization design features identified in Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The
Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761 (2001), as well as with the control
mechanisms developed by DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999),
and by JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION? THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002).
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Figure 3 illustrates the attributes that affect independence:
Figure 3: Attributes Affecting Independence

Precision

Low
Specific and exhaustively
defined mandate.

High
Vague mandate.

Little oversight, no
reporting requirements.

Oversight

Extensive oversight,
regular reporting
requirements, tight
control over resource
and staff.

Rules and
Procedures

Consent-based
decisionmaking;
procedures ensure no
decisions taken without
input from all members.

Financial
Control
Mechanisms

Funding voluntary or the
body is highly dependent
on additional voluntary
contributions.

Independent sources of
funding, or funding is
nested in larger, fairly
fixed organizational
resources that hinder
individual targeting of
financial restrictions.

Permanence

Instant exit permitted.
Renegotiation very easy.

Exit either disallowed or
highly infeasible.
Renegotiation impossible
or very difficult.

State does not need to be
included or informed of
decisionmaking and
actions.

One factor that affects the independence of the international body is the
precision of the grant. Unlike legalization, delegation does not necessarily
correlate with a higher degree of precision. Indeed, other things being equal, a
more precise delegation will be more constrained, presenting less room for
agency slack or diverging interpretations among member states. Thus, one
reason the delegation to the UN Security Council is so extensive is that it can be
triggered by the Council’s determination that there has been a “threat to the
peace,” which is a broad and imprecise standard. Of course, for a particular
delegation, the subject matter of the delegation may be a more significant factor
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than precision. For example, the authority of the International Criminal Court
is defined relatively precisely, but it nevertheless involves a high level of
delegation, in part because of the subject matter. In some cases precision may
actually increase the delegation, such as where a formulation adds exclusivity to
an international body’s mandate.
States can also limit independence though formal oversight mechanisms:
institutional checks and balances, such as requirements for approval by the state
parties; voting rules; and the ability to hire and fire the entity’s staff. As the
literature on the U.S. Congress has demonstrated, rules and procedures can
serve as powerful constraints on the use of authority, but they can also result in
the allocation of power to less-than-obvious bodies, which may be able to use
gatekeeping procedures and rules to veto actions or force their consideration.75
Given the multilayered nature of the bodies nested within a given delegation,
the oversight mechanisms therefore become crucial to the actual impact of any
grant of authority.76 A delegation that prima facie appears to be in a core issue
area, such as security, may in reality be so severely circumscribed by oversight
mechanisms that discretion is minimal. The international body’s independence
therefore depends on the larger institutional structure, the rules and procedures
of decisionmaking, and the voice that any given state retains in the body.
Indeed, some of the more interesting work on international delegation in the
future may consider exactly the impact of these complex institutional designs.
For adjudicative delegations, the body’s independence will be affected by
the jurisdiction of the tribunal as well as by the rules and procedures for the
appointment and tenure of judges and staff and the extent of state control over
the salaries and resources. 77 As noted, precision generally reduces the level of
independence. Keohane and others point out that “the greater the uncertainty
concerning the proper interpretation or norm in a given case, the more
potential legal independence it possesses.”78 Tribunals will have the highest
independence if they have general compulsory jurisdiction, but they will have
less independence when there is a requirement of separate state consent to have
the particular subject matter of the dispute resolved by the tribunal.
Independence is also lower if the jurisdiction of the international tribunal is
subject to a requirement of exhausting local remedies, or (as is the case for the
International Criminal Court) to a principle of “complementarity” whereby
national courts can displace the international tribunal’s jurisdiction. Ad hoc
arbitration often involves a low level of independence since there is a

75. See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (2002).
76. Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
77. See Keohane et al., supra note 36, at 460; see also Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial
Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005); Laurence R. Helfer & AnneMarie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo,
93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005).
78. Keohane et al., supra note 36, at 461.
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requirement of state consent on a case-by-case basis, and since some of the
judges will typically be selected by the states involved.
For other types of delegated authority, the independence of a given
international body depends on the rules and nested relationships among the
different decisionmaking and implementation bodies. As Figure 1 and Table 1
illustrate, in addition to delegating simultaneously to different bodies within the
larger framework, an international agreement may also grant different types of
authority to the different bodies, and each grant of authority may be subject to
different levels of control by the state. A state’s ability to control delegation to a
secretariat, for example, is modified by the authority granted to a council or
conference of parties that oversees the secretariat, and by the rules and
procedures that guide a state’s ability to influence decisions by these other
bodies. The overall independence of an international body such as the World
Health Organization therefore depends ultimately on how much control the
highest decision organ has over other bodies in the organization and how
autonomous that decision organ is from the member states.
Independence varies not only among different types of international
delegations, but also among countries with respect to the same body, since
different countries may have a different ability to control the body. In
institutions such as the World Bank, for example, some countries such as the
United States have strong controls while others have weak ones. This may be
due to different allocation of votes, or to different representation on various
bodies, or, less formally, to different levels of geopolitical power or financial
contributions through which states may exert other forms of control throughout
the delegation chain.
If a state is itself a member of a decision organ of an international body, this
membership decreases the body’s independence, but it does not eliminate it.
For example, under the Landmines Convention, the meeting of states’ parties
can “authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of
States’ Parties present and voting.”79 The requested state, subject to some
limitations, has to grant access to all areas and installations under its control.80
As discussed earlier, states may not be able to control bodies even when they
hold veto power or when consensus is required. This is especially true if the
body’s affirmative consent is needed, as is the case with the UN Security
Council with respect to some uses of military force. If the decisionmaking body
consists of a subgroup of member states, the body clearly is more autonomous
vis-à-vis the excluded states. The most autonomous bodies are the classic
bureaucracies of the UN secretariat or the IMF fund management in which
states are not members, although the majority of these have oversight bodies
controlled by states. As pointed out by principal–agent theory, such control is
diluted by informational asymmetries, which enable shirking or professional
biases.
79. Landmines Convention, supra note 26, at art. VIII, ¶ 8.
80. Id. ¶ 14.
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A very common type of control mechanism is the ability of states to
withhold funding or other resources from an international body. An obvious
example is the staffing of peacekeeping missions. Whereas the UN Security
Council may use its delegated authority to mandate military action, such
mandates cannot be implemented without troop commitments, which by
tradition are ad hoc and therefore highly vulnerable to the preferences of
individual states. Even mandatory contributions to international organizations
may be withheld, as the United Nations experienced in the 1990s when the
United States refused to pay its dues until the organization reformed. Although
their monetary impact is lower, even small states can send effective protest
signals by withholding funding. Conversely, states can also enhance their
delegation by providing international bodies with additional voluntary
contributions of money, staff, or other resources. In addition to individual state
funding decisions, states can collectively reduce the level of contributions if they
want to abrogate the power of runaway bodies. In other cases, states may want
to fund international bodies in advance so as to place limits on their own ability
to interfere with the body’s decisionmaking power. One such case is the Iran–
U.S. Claims Tribunal, in which the two states allocated funds to allow the
tribunal to function as independently as possible.81
A final factor affecting the independence of an international body is the
permanence of the delegation. Permanence refers to how easy it is for a state to
extricate itself from the delegation or from select provisions. This factor
encompasses both the duration of the delegation (for example, the Kyoto
Protocol sets a target only for a certain period, and ad hoc arbitral tribunals
may exist only for one case);82 how easy it is for a state to renegotiate the terms
of the delegation; and the ability to exit, which varies in terms of the amount of
notice required and other conditions in the agreement.83 Renegotiation,
although legally possible, may be complicated by the rules and procedures of
the delegation, as well as by the relative power relationships between states. If
all states agree that a delegation has gone awry, renegotiation is obviously much
easier than if a state finds over time that it has become a preference outlier. Exit
may also be complicated by the degree to which a state’s participation in the
delegation is embedded in other arrangements. Thus, although exit may be
feasible legally, in practice it may be difficult. This would presumably be the
case with withdrawal from the Euro, which is embedded in the monetary policy
of the EU, and for withdrawal from the European Court of Human Rights,
which is embedded in Council of Europe membership. Indeed, since
participation in most international organizations is not à la carte, it presents
states with a set of tradeoffs that may make exit undesirable even if states are
displeased with particular institutional features. By contrast, exit is easier for
81. See Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, http://www.iusct.org/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
82. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
83. See Helfer, supra note 13.
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stand-alone delegations that are not embedded in other commitments or
membership—such as the dispute-resolution protocol to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, from which the United States withdrew in
2005.84
V
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION
In deciding whether to delegate authority to international institutions, states
will weigh the benefits against the costs. In this Part, the nature of the benefits
and costs associated with different types of delegation are considered, as are
various factors that may influence the levels of these different categories of
benefits and costs.
A. Benefits of Delegation
Scholars have made significant progress in identifying the benefits of
international cooperation.85 Many of these benefits derive more specifically
from the international delegation inherent in much of this cooperation.86 First,
states can benefit from the specialization that may develop when they delegate
to bodies that can gather complex knowledge and generate expertise from the
execution of repeated tasks.87 The benefits of such expertise are particularly
apparent in bodies like the WHO, which by its vast collection of state
knowledge is invaluable in developing emergency strategies for fighting the
spread of viruses such as the recent and deadly bird-flu strain.88 Similarly, the
international police organization Interpol facilitates pooling of knowledge
about drugs, human trafficking, and other crimes.89 The level of expertise that
this organization can attain is thus greater than what any one state could create
alone.
In international cooperation, it is often the act of delegation that enhances
the credibility of international commitments and thus facilitates international
cooperation. When the core of an international agreement rests on a set of
behavioral commitments that states may have incentives to evade, delegating
authority to bodies that can monitor and perhaps enforce the commitments
reduces incentives to renege on these commitments. This is the role of many

84. See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A1.
85. See, e.g., ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1992); LISA L. MARTIN, COERCIVE COOPERATION: EXPLAINING
MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (1992).
86. For a recent summary of the benefits of delegation, see HAWKINS ET AL., supra note 3, at 13–
20. See also Oona Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 115 (Winter 2008).
87. See HAWKINS ET AL., supra note 3, at 13–15.
88. See World Health Organization, Avian Influenza, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_
influenza/en/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
89. See generally Interpol, Interpol’s Core Four Functions, http://www.interpol.int/Public/
icpo/about.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
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oversight committees created in areas such as human rights and arms control.
Such monitoring enables states to commit more credibly to cooperation and
therefore overcome classic time-inconsistency problems.
Delegation also can be used for the resolution of disputes, which in turn
allows states to continue cooperation. This is naturally the objective of direct
delegation of dispute-resolution authority, but it may also be a more indirect
benefit of other forms of delegation. For example, collective bodies can be a
useful forum for resolving disputes among states by allowing discussion and
resolution according to preset rules, and specialized agencies can provide
information that may be useful in addressing disputes. In many agreements, the
“Collective of the Whole” or the “Conference of the Parties” serves such a
function.
In addition, it is often some form of delegation that reduces transaction
costs of interstate cooperation. When states are unable to work out all the
details of their cooperative agreements, they benefit from delegating authority
to bodies that can coordinate solutions and make running policy decisions so
that states do not have to continually renegotiate. This benefit is evident with
specialized bodies such as the International Maritime Organization and in the
area of food standards, in which delegation facilitates detailed but necessary
regulation.
Finally, delegation can enhance the ability of states to control movements of
goods, persons, pollutants, ideas, and diseases across their borders. This is what
Stephen Krasner has labeled “interdependence sovereignty.”90 Controlling such
cross-border movements in turn enhances the ability of states to control
domestic activity.91
The different types of delegated authority carry these benefits to varying
degrees. Adjudicative delegation can generate many of them. It creates gains
from specialization, enhances credibility by assisting in the monitoring and
enforcement of agreements, and inherently can resolve disputes, enabling
continued cooperation. The decisions of adjudicative institutions may also help
solve future coordination dilemmas and reduce transaction costs by assisting
states in the implementation of their agreements because they provide guidance
on the interpretation and expectations of the agreements.
Regulatory authority likewise provides gains from specialization. This
specialization is valuable because it helps states coordinate policies by filling in
the many gaps in their existing agreements. States also benefit from delegating
legislative and agenda-setting authority to collective bodies because this allows
them a forum for negotiating solutions that can extend the scope or duration of
their cooperation. Granting monitoring and enforcement authority naturally
benefits states by providing those functions and thus enhancing the credibility
of their commitments, but it also generates specialization in the body that may
90. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 12 (1999).
91. See Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 841, 857–62 (2003).
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further facilitate these tasks. States benefit from delegating policyimplementation authority and research-and-advice authority because these
engender specialization and help states to collectively implement policies or
pool their knowledge.
The benefits of delegation also vary with the issue area. Although it is
difficult for states to cooperate on some issue areas, such as security, criminal
adjudication, and international trade, the benefits can be proportionately large
if states can do so. Nevertheless, it does not follow that areas that are less
sensitive in terms of state sovereignty necessarily provide lower benefits from
delegation. Indeed, delegating authority to regulate and implement policies on
air-traffic rules or postal cooperation, while relatively uncontroversial, can yield
significant social benefits for states and their citizens. Moreover, because the
costs of these delegations are fairly low, the net benefits can be particularly
large.
The benefits from delegation do not, however, necessarily depend on
whether the delegation is legally binding. That is, delegation is not by definition
more beneficial because it is legally binding, although that might be the case in
some instances. Making a delegation legally binding may be particularly
unnecessary when states do not have an incentive to evade their commitments
or otherwise escape their obligations. Moreover, it is possible that states may be
more likely to rely on delegation when it is not legally binding. Thus, the
benefits of nonbinding dispute resolution could actually be greater than that of
binding dispute-resolution authority, if states would be more likely to use it.
Nonbinding regulatory authority might also yield common policies more easily,
and states might be more wiling to accept and implement such regulation.
Overall, the usefulness of legally binding delegation depends on the structure of
the underlying cooperation problem.92 It is therefore not possible to generalize
that benefits from delegation by definition are greater for legally binding
delegation.
B. Costs
International delegations can also impose various costs on states. Because a
delegation by definition entails a grant of authority, an international delegation
can lead to reductions in state autonomy through displacement of its
decisionmaking or control.93 Some scholars have referred to these reductions in
autonomy as “sovereignty costs.”94 The term can be misleading, however,

92. See generally Arthur Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, 36
INT’L ORG. 299 (1982) (discussing the nature, development, changes, and breakdown of regimes).
93. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT’L ORG. 421, 436–38 (2000); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 227 (2000).
94. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 93, at 436–37 (discussing the concept of “sovereignty
costs” and noting that these costs can “range from simple differences in outcome on particular issues, to
loss of authority over decision making in an issue-area, to more fundamental encroachments on state
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because international delegations can also be seen as an exercise of sovereignty,
since one of the recognized legal attributes of sovereignty is the capacity to
engage in foreign relations, including the capacity to conclude binding
international agreements that entail delegation.95 Moreover, as discussed above,
international delegations can enhance the ability of a state to control its
borders, which is an attribute of sovereignty.96
In addition to autonomy costs, international delegations may require the
state to compromise its preferred policy outcome.97 This compromise is required
both because the state will need to coordinate with other states that may have
different preferred policy outcomes, and, as elaborated by principal–agent
theory, because there may be divergence between the state’s preferences and
those of the staff of the international institution.98
International delegations also increase the costs of noncompliance with
international commitments. Indeed, that is also one of their goals. International
delegations can serve as focal points for the imposition of collective sanctions,
whether they are reputational, economic, or military. The WTO, for example,
sets up a formal mechanism through which retaliatory sanctions can be
imposed.99 Research has shown that international sanctions are more effective
when conducted through an international organization.100
Finally, international delegations can impose opportunity costs in terms of
the use of resources. By contributing financial resources to an organization, or
dedicating personnel to staff or interact with the organization, a state forfeits
the opportunity to use those resources for other purposes. The organization
may also be inefficient in its use of the resources, with the result that an activity
may cost more when accomplished through a delegation.
The extent to which a state incurs any of these costs will vary with the type
of delegated authority. Several of the different types of delegations may
produce shifts in decisionmaking authority, and, relatedly, potential
compromises of policy preferences. This is likely to be greatest for legislative
authority that is binding and not subject to individual state ratification, and for
adjudicative authority that is enforceable through direct effects in the domestic
legal system of a state. Some types of monitoring and enforcement delegation,
sovereignty”); Moravcsik, supra note 93, at 227 (defining “sovereignty cost” as “the surrender of
national discretion”).
95. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 201 (1987) (“[A]
state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population . . . and that engages in, or has
the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”). This is part of what Stephen
Krasner refers to as “international legal sovereignty.” See KRASNER, supra note 90, at 14–20.
96. See supra Part V.A.
97. See David A. Lake & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation to International
Organizations, in HAWKINS ET AL., supra note 3, at 341, 366; David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran,
Sovereignty and Delegation in International Organizations, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (Winter
2008).
98. See Lake & McCubbins, supra note 97.
99. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).
100. See generally MARTIN, supra note 85.
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particularly if they involve physical intrusion in the territory of the state, may
also reduce state autonomy. On a lesser level, there may also be shifts in
decisionmaking power when states delegate regulatory authority, especially if
the regulatory decisions take effect without ratification. The delegation of
agenda-setting power may also influence decisionmaking processes when the
international body can obligate states to consider certain legislation. This is the
case when, for example, the International Labour Organization can create new
treaties that member states must consider.101 Even if they do not shift formal
decisionmaking powers, legislative, regulatory, adjudicative, and agenda-setting
authority may allow international bodies to bring attention to issues and thus
influence domestic decisionmaking indirectly. This is also the case when states
appoint bodies to provide advice and research, because these bodies thus obtain
a platform from which to influence debates.
Costs of noncompliance are a byproduct of the delegation of
decisionmaking powers. Such costs have long been studied by political scientists
who note that such noncompliance may carry not only direct costs such as fines
or expulsion from organizations, but also bring indirect costs to the state
through the possible damage to its reputation as a credible cooperation partner.
These costs are most likely to occur when the state has delegated legislative,
adjudicative, or regulatory authority. However, delegating monitoring and
enforcement authority may also result in noncompliance costs, mostly of a
reputational nature if the state fails to provide the required information or
cooperate with international monitoring authorities.
Opportunity costs of expended resources occur in some minimal form in
connection with all delegation that entails any kind of administrative apparatus.
These administrative costs aside, the most significant resource opportunity costs
are usually associated with implementation authority or with the types of
authority that may, in themselves, incur expensive administrative costs, such as
adjudicative authority or research-and-advice authority. For example, ad hoc
tribunals may be expensive to operate, as may international research facilities
such as the European Organization for Nuclear Research.
The level of each of these opportunity costs depends on the factors that also
determine the extent of the delegation. First, the costs will intensify with the
independence of the international body and the legal effect of the delegation.
Independent bodies are harder to control, and this makes it more difficult for
the state to assure that the body’s policies align with state preferences. The
greater the legal effect of a delegation, the costlier it will also be for states in
terms of either reputational costs flowing from noncompliance, or foregone
policy options flowing from reduced decisionmaking powers.
In addition, the magnitude of the costs will vary depending on the issue area
of the delegation. For historical, cultural, and functional reasons, states will tend
to perceive some issues as more closely related to their sovereignty than other

101. See Helfer, supra note 56.
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issues. The costs of delegation are highest when issues touch on elements of
Westphalian sovereignty such as territory or relations between a state and its
citizens.102 Delegations on security issues are particularly costly because they
relate to the preservation of the state. Thus, delegations of military-command
authority (such as allowing foreign or international officials to direct national
troops) entail relatively high costs because such a delegation relates closely to
national security and the protection of a state’s citizens.
A related consideration is whether the delegation overlaps or conflicts with
traditional exercises of domestic authority. The costs of delegation are higher
for subjects that have traditionally been regulated by the state, such as criminal
law and punishment, family relationships, and religious freedom. In contrast,
delegations on issues relating to international waters, the arctic regions, or outer
space refer to common-pool resources and thus imply less of a restriction on
traditional national prerogatives, reducing any costs. Indeed, on some commonpool resources, states may enjoy benefits only to the extent that they become
entitled to assert authority where no such confirmed right previously existed.
Similarly, the delegation costs also depend on the scope and range of the
issue areas involved. The World Trade Organization, for example, has a broad
range of issue areas because it addresses virtually all trade issues, not just
isolated sectors. The delegation to the World Health Organization is of
similarly broad scope, while the delegation in the Montreal Protocol is narrowly
focused on ozone-depleting pollutants. For adjudication, an important factor
relating to scope of authority concerns not only the type of cases that fall within
the jurisdiction of the court, but also whether the tribunal can hear claims by, or
operate against, individuals.103 This is true, for example, with the International
Criminal Court and the European Court of Human Rights, but not of the ICJ.
Other things being equal, broader delegations entail higher potential costs.
The costs of different types of delegation will also vary among states. Some
states may invest fewer resources in an organization, thus clearly reducing their
opportunity costs of resources. States with strong internal mechanisms for
implementing international obligations may also find that, in practice, such
obligations entail higher noncompliance costs than for states without such
mechanisms.104 The costs of a delegation can also vary between states because
some states may have refrained from ratifying protocols or optional provisions
such that they have in fact delegated less authority than other states. A classic
example is whether states have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ.105
102. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 93, at 437, 440; see also KRASNER, supra note 90, at 20–25
(discussing Westphalian sovereignty).
103. For more on access, see Keohane et al., supra note 36.
104. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 93, at 428.
105. States’ parties to the ICJ Statute “may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation,
the jurisdiction of the Court . . . .” Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, ¶ 2, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?
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The most important variation in the costs that different states may incur
from delegation, however, depends on what a state’s preferences and policies
would have been in the absence of the delegation. In practice, states do not
have equally broad ranges of available policy options. By delegating to the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the Dominican Republic may in theory
accept the same restrictions on development of nuclear weapons as Iran. Since
the Dominican Republic would not be capable of or have interests in
developing nuclear weapons, however, in reality this delegation is much costlier
for Iran. Similarly, the International Criminal Court poses lower real costs for
states that, unlike the United States, do not regularly engage in significant
military operations.106
The policy costs depend further on the configuration of preferences among
states on any given issue. It is costlier to delegate when preferences diverge
because the international bodies are more likely to exercise discretion in
controversial ways. It is another matter, however, when state preferences are
closely aligned, either because all states are facing a similar problem, or because
the underlying problem is mostly one of coordination on technical matters.
When there are greater preference alignments, it is less likely that a state will be
a preference outlier, and the bodies to which states grant authority are likely to
have preferences that are more aligned with states as well, thus reducing the
expected costs due to slack.107
Finally, the different costs of delegation can change over time. A good
example is the role of the International Court of Justice in deciding disputes
arising under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna
Convention). In the late 1960s, the United States agreed in a treaty to allow the
ICJ to have jurisdiction over Vienna Convention disputes.108 Most provisions in
the Vienna Convention concern interstate issues such as the scope of consular
immunity. One of the provisions in the Convention, however, refers to a right of
foreign nationals to receive certain types of notice when they are arrested in a
party country.109 Starting in the late 1990s, the ICJ began relying on this
provision to decide cases relating to U.S. criminal procedure in death-penalty
cases involving foreign nationals.110 This development substantially increased the
p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (last visited Sept. 2, 2007). Currently, sixty-five states accept this jurisdiction. See
International Court of Justice, States Entitled to Appear Before the Court, http://www.icjcij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&sp3=a (last visited Sept. 2, 2007).
106. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 89 (2003).
107. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 93, at 440–41.
108. See Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 168, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963_disputes.pdf.
109. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, ¶ 1(b), Apr. 24, 1963, T.I.A.S. 6820, 596
U.N.T.S. 261, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf
(“[S]aid authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights.”).
110. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisional
Measures, 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466 (June 27); Case
Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ Rep. 12 (Mar. 31).
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decision cost of the arrangement for the United States, and eventually the
United States withdrew from the jurisdictional treaty.111
VI
QUESTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In addition to providing a common vocabulary, a typology should stimulate
thinking, in this case about the nature and consequences of international
delegation. The typology presented here raises a number of questions. As an
initial matter, the typology reveals the need for additional empirical work
concerning the types and incidence of international delegations, and the nature
of the relationship between states and international institutions. This article has
illustrated the typology with examples, but it has not systematically assessed
how frequently states actually delegate the various kinds of authority, or the
extent to which states control the independence of the bodies they create. And
although the literature on the rational design of international institutions has
begun to examine the incidence of various basic features of international
organizations,112 it is not yet known how many international bodies have been
granted different types of authority. Barbara Koremenos makes an important
first contribution to this question in her article for this issue.113 Likewise,
although there has been some work on the frequency of certain types of control
mechanisms, such as the ability of states to exit an agreement,114 that sort of
systematic study is rare. Debates in international relations and law about how
much delegation there is and how much it matters are, therefore, largely
anecdotal. Hopefully the typology presented here will facilitate additional
empirical research, as well as a more precise consideration of the nature of state
delegations of authority.
The typology may also aid the study of the extent to which variations in
benefits and costs actually explain state behavior with respect to delegations.
Although several studies examine why some states may ratify various legal
agreements or participate in international cooperation, studies that explain
participation in international delegation more specifically are lacking. From a
rational-choice perspective, cost-benefit calculations should be important
determinants. Thus, one would expect states that anticipate the costs of
delegation to outweigh its benefits to refrain from delegating. From a more
constructivist perspective, however, one might also expect norms and beliefs to
influence delegation decisions. For example, some states may be particularly
averse to delegation of dispute-resolution authority, and this may explain their
111. See supra text accompanying note 86. The European Court of Justice and the International
Labour Organization present additional examples of how an international institution may expand its
authority over time. See ALTER, supra note 50; Helfer, supra note 56.
112. See, for example, the special issue of International Organizations on this topic, 55 INT’L ORG.
761 (2001).
113. See Barbara Koremenos, When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?, 71 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (Winter 2008).
114. See Helfer, supra note 13.

01__BRADLEY_KELLEY.DOC

Winter 2008]

6/9/2008 7:53:54 AM

THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION

33

lower participation in some international cooperation. It would also be
interesting to explore the extent to which the delegation inherent in any
particular international agreement can explain states’ decisions to sign and
ratify the agreement. Perhaps some states, for various reasons, are more
delegation-averse, and perhaps this can explain variation in overall
international cooperation.
In addition, just as scholars have argued that soft law may be
consequential,115 this article’s inclusion of nonbinding delegation may stimulate
thinking about “soft delegation.” Whereas the study of soft law has revealed
that nonbinding commitments can have powerful repercussions for state
behavior, this article suggests that soft delegation—the granting of nonbinding
authority to international actors—can be similarly powerful. The actions of
many of these international bodies circumscribe states’ policy autonomy by
creating international or domestic pressure on those governments. This can
occur in a variety of ways, including through nonbinding arbitration,
committees charged with receiving and commenting on reports from the states
parties, and the issuance of advisory legal opinions and nonbinding standards
and codes.
The typology also raises questions about the multi-layered nature of
delegation. In any given international agreement, states simultaneously
delegate different types of authority to different bodies, which enjoy different
degrees of independence.116 Although this is not new, the inclusion here of
collectives, or subgroups of states, is not only a more realistic portrayal of
delegation, but it also invites more complex theorizing about the locus of
power. A narrow focus on third parties tends to limit theorizing to principal–
agent approaches that concentrate on the relationship between states and large
international bureaucracies. When states delegate authority internationally,
however, managing that relationship is only part of their concern. Of equal or
greater concern is that decisions and actions will be taken jointly with other
states.
This article’s broader typology can cast light on how different institutional
environments locate power differently within different international
organizations, and thus why certain international organizations tend to become
associated with particular bodies within their systems. The World Bank, for
example, is often associated with its board, and the UN with its Security
Council. The degree of overall delegation by any one state to a given
international organization is also determined by the interrelationship of the
different interacting bodies within the organization. Discussion of international
delegation and the accountability and legitimacy of international organizations
may also benefit from properly identifying the controls that different bodies
exert within organizations.

115. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 93, at 421.
116. See supra Part III.B.
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Contrary to prior work on international delegation, which tends to speak of
authority as uniform, the typology also draws attention to the fact that states
delegate authority of different types. This raises questions about the activities of
different bodies with delegated authority. Many of the first questions are
descriptive, because scholars have not explored this variety. The descriptive
inquiries, however, can then lead to more causal analysis. For example,
although states sometimes grant legislative powers in practice, how often do
international bodies amend their underlying treaties or issue binding directives?
If we do not often see legislative actions, why is this authority included? If we
do see legislative actions, why do these come about? Are those decisions driven
by powerful states? Do they result from emergent normative discourse? Who
governs the formal reshaping of international bodies through legislation, and
how does that vary across institutions? Understanding the institutional change
is important for studies of global governance and legitimacy and accountability,
and they can be aided by inquiries into the uses and controls of different types
of authorities.
Equally interesting might be research into the delegation of other types of
authority, such as formal agenda-setting power. Although few bodies have the
agenda-setting power of the European Commission, many international bodies
do exercise meaningful, formal agenda-setting power when, for example, their
members are required to bring conventions adopted by the body before their
domestic authorities. When and how do some international bodies manage to
exercise their agenda-setting power effectively? How is the agenda-setting
power of international bodies influenced by institutional features such as who
may propose an initiative, the voting rules, and the rules governing
amendments? What factors determine the magnitude of the agenda-setting
power of international bodies? Does it rise with the complexity of a subject
matter or with the divergence in preferences of member states? The exploration
of the legal and practical causes and consequences of other types of authority
may yield similarly interesting questions.
Another set of questions about types of authority relates to institutional
design. Scholars have begun to study why states design international
organizations the way they do. This question is hardly complete without
considering the different types of authority delegated. What are the
relationships between the different types of authority? Do certain types of
authority tend to “go together,” or are some types of authority mutually
exclusive? Is it, for example, the case that bodies with great regulatory power
tend not to have enforcement power? How do the types of authorities vary with
the degree of legal obligation inherent in the underlying treaty? Although our
typology has grouped them together, what is the relationship between
monitoring authority and enforcement authority, and to what extent can
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monitoring authority substitute for lack of formal enforcement authority?117 Do
some issue areas tend to be associated with adjudicative authority, while others
tend to be associated with monitoring authority? Or can we better understand
the types of authority delegated by looking at the underlying structure of the
collaboration problem, regardless of issue area? Likely it is a combination
thereof, but specifying the types of authority may help us make the connections.
The typology may also have implications for considerations of domestic
politics. States are represented in most international institutions solely by
executive agents. Nevertheless, these institutions increasingly engage in a
variety of legislative and regulatory activities, thus posing questions about their
effect on domestic distributions of authority between legislative and executive
bodies. In addition, the rise of international adjudicative institutions may affect
the authority of domestic courts within their systems. Another structural issue
posed by international delegations is their effect on federal systems of
government, such as the one in the United States.118 Questions can also be raised
about the connections between international delegations and interest-group
politics, and the effects of such delegations on domestic political bargaining. Do
certain types of bodies or certain types of delegated authority lend themselves
to greater influence by domestic political groups? May international delegations
sometimes enhance or decrease the power of domestic actors?119
Furthermore, the typology presents a number of issues relating to the legal
implications of international delegations. As the typology makes clear, the legal
effect of a delegation is a significant factor affecting its cost. The cost is
particularly high when there is domestic as well as international legal effect.
This consideration may influence how domestic institutions construe the output
of international institutions. U.S. courts, for example, may construe
international orders and decisions as “non-self-executing” in the U.S. legal
system.120 In addition, as international institutions increasingly handle regulatory
duties, questions may be raised about the extent to which domestic legal
controls that mirror those governing domestic regulatory entities should be
imposed.121

117. For a discussion of international institutions and compliance focusing on monitoring
arrangements, see generally Xinyuan Dai, Information Systems of Treaty Regimes, 54 WORLD POL. 405
(July 2002).
118. See Neil S. Siegel, International Delegations and the Values of Federalism, 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 93 (Winter 2008).
119. See, e.g., Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO
Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257 (Winter 2008).
120. See, e.g., U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“We find
in these clauses no intent to vest citizens who reside in a U.N. member nation with authority to enforce
an ICJ decision against their own government.”); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (“[The provisions at issue] do not by their terms confer rights upon individual citizens.”). See
generally Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-SelfExecution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1587–95 (2003).
121. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 53; Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global
Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
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By identifying the different types of delegated authority and the various
factors influencing the overall level of delegation, the typology may also be
helpful in identifying more precisely what types of delegations raise
constitutional or other legal concerns. In the United States, these concerns will
be translated into doctrinal considerations such as the formal processes for
making law and treaties, the nondelegation doctrine, restrictions imposed by
the Appointments Clause, limitations on the extent to which adjudicative
functions can be delegated to “non-Article III courts,” and federalism
restraints. Such concerns may in turn affect the legal controls that the United
States places on international delegations—through treaty provisions,
reservations, implementing legislation, and other mechanisms.
In exploring these issues, there are obvious opportunities for interaction and
collaboration between legal and political-science scholars. A full political
assessment of the features of international delegation may need to take account
of the legal environments in which these delegations take place. It may be
useful to consider, for example, the extent to which domestic or international
legal considerations influence the incidence and structure of international
delegations, and the extent to which there are legal mechanisms for controlling
or terminating a delegation. Social-science assessments of the benefits and costs
of international delegation, and their effect on state behavior and the operation
of domestic politics, may in turn be relevant to legal considerations of their
proper design and validity.
VII
CONCLUSION
International delegations are a significant and growing component of
international relations, and they implicate a number of important legal and
political questions. In the past, analysis of the delegation component of
international cooperation has often been limited to the study of international
bureaucracies or has simply been subsumed within a broader cooperation
framework. As a result, the causes and consequences of international
delegation remain understudied. This article has identified various types of
international delegations as well as factors that can affect their costs and
benefits. We hope that these conceptual distinctions will facilitate additional
consideration of the legal and political dynamics of international delegation.

